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Social Preferences and Relational Contracting Performance:  
An Experimental Investigation 
 
1.  Introduction 
In an effort to incorporate greater behavioral realism into economic models, researchers 
have developed and tested a growing array of social preference models, i.e., individual models of 
utility that deviate from models of pure self interest (Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher (2002) 
provide an extensive review of modeling efforts; a partial list of more recent work includes Gary 
Charness  and  Matthew  Rabin  (2002),  James  C.  Cox  (2004),  Martin  Dufwenberg  and  Georg 
Kirchsteiger (2004), Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel (2004), Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts, 
and Axel Ockenfels (2005), Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer (2005), Yoella Bereby-Meyer and 
Muriel Niederle (2005), and Armin Falk and Fischbacher (2006)).  Recent contributions in this 
field have focused on devising simple experimental games that allow for efficient testing of 
competing models of social or other-regarding preferences (e.g., Charness and Rabin (2002), 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005)).   
  The ultimate goal of such model development and testing is to predict how outcomes in 
more  complex  economic  interactions  will  be  affected  by  the  presence  of  agents  with  social 
preferences.  Significant experimental evidence  documents outcomes that deviate from those 
predicted by models of pure self-interest (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Arno Riedl (1993, 1996, 1998), 
Fehr, Simon Gachter, and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr et al. (1998), Fehr and Falk (1999), Charness 
and  Ernan  Haruvy  (2002),  R.  Lynn  Hannan,  John  H.  Kagel,  and  Donald  V.  Moser  (2002), 
Brandts and Charness (2004), Brandts, Riedl and Frans van Winden (2004), Charness (2004), 
Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (2004), and Martin Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004)), and gauges the 
strength and nature of social preferences indirectly from the size and direction of the deviations 
from equilibrium values predicted under pure self interest.  Less theoretical progress has been    
  2 
made in developing solution concepts for richer, dynamic economic settings involving agents 
possessing  social  preferences,  though  several  contributions  are  notable  (Fehr  and  Schmidt 
(2000), Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)). 
  Previous theoretical work by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) establishes that the presence 
of  enough  agents  with  other-regarding  preferences  in  a  finitely  repeated  market  game  can 
generate  equilibrium  surplus  higher  than  that  obtainable  when  the  market  is  populated  with 
purely  self-interested  agents.    Brown,  Falk  and  Fehr  (2004)  also  demonstrate  that  subjects 
participating in an experimental contracting market did indeed exceed the surplus predictions 
associated with a model featuring participants with purely self-regarding preferences.   
Our contribution is to use a within-subject design to explicitly link a subject’s social 
preferences as measured by simple, intentional social preference games to subsequent behavior 
in a complex, dynamic relational contracting setting.  To facilitate comparability with previous 
contributions  we  utilize  existing  experimental  protocol  for  measuring  intentional  social 
preferences  (Charness  and  Rabin  (2002),  hereafter,  CR)  and  for  documenting  behavior  in 
relational contracting settings (Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004), hereafter BFF).  The responses 
from the ‘cold’ CR setting are then used to explain behavior in subsequent ‘hot’ experimental 
market activity. 
The  BFF  relational  contracting  environment  provides  a  rich  market  landscape  upon 
which to observe the influence of social preferences.  Buyers initiate contracting offers and can 
extend offers to all sellers simultaneously (public offers) or to a single seller (private offers), 
which enables long-term relationships.  Sellers outnumber buyers and are, therefore, subject to 
involuntary unemployment.  However, sellers may unilaterally deviate from contract terms and 
claim substantial short-term rewards for such shirking.  Buyers, while offered no immediate    
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recourse  to  such  shirking,  can  track  past  partners’  performance  and  avoid  such  sellers  in 
subsequent dealings. 
Our analysis of more than 500 trades transacted under relational contracts confirms and 
calibrates the hypotheses forwarded by both BFF and CR, i.e., welfare exceeding self-interested 
Nash  equilibrium  levels  is  driven,  in  part,  by  the  presence  of  subjects  with  other-regarding 
preferences.    Furthermore  our  analysis  refines  the  contribution  of  BFF  by  identifying  how 
specific  types  of  social  preferences  shape  the  ebb  and  flow  of  contractual  negotiations  and 
performance.   
We find a substantial role for social preferences in explaining the type of trade that is 
observed  (public  vs.  private),  the  content  of  offers  (price  and  effort  requests),  sellers’ 
performance  and  buyers’  expectations  of  seller  performance,  even  after  controlling  for 
potentially confounding demographic determinants such as academic major and gender.  In many 
instances  the  nature  of  social  preferences  exhibited  during  the  CR  games  manifests  in  a 
straightforward manner in the contractual setting, e.g., social efficiency sellers improve total 
trading surplus by shirking less while buyers, who are vulnerable to shirking, fare relatively well 
in contracts when either party exhibits maximin social preferences. 
Other  manifestations  of  social  preferences  are  more  nuanced.    For  example,  social 
efficiency and maximin buyers are much more likely to engage in private rather than public 
exchanges, while buyers displaying competitive preferences avoid private trades.  This sorting of 
social  preference  types  into  different  trading  domains  has  fundamental  implications  for  the 
generation and distribution of surplus because, on average, trades initiated via private offers 
feature more than twice the total surplus of publicly initiated trades and, furthermore, the surplus 
generated under private trading is more evenly divided between parties.  The commitment of 
social efficiency buyers to utilizing private trades, coupled with infrequent shirking by social    
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efficiency sellers, results in frequent matching of social efficiency buyers with social efficiency 
sellers, which results in trades that often generate the maximum possible social surplus. 
Many aspects of the resulting trade differ according to whether the parties are involved in 
privately or publicly initiated trades, with the role of social preferences being stronger in private 
trades.  For example, social efficiency sellers shirk significantly less than other types in private 
trades, but shirk as much as other types in public trades.  When trading is initiated privately, the 
buyer’s type manifests most strongly in the non-binding quality request: once we control for 
relevant information concerning past performance of the seller and the existing length of the 
relationship,  we  find  that  competitive  and  inequality  averse  buyers  set  a  high  bar  for  seller 
performance while selfish buyers set the lowest bar.  By contrast, in the public domain, quality 
requests differ by buyer type in the early rounds, but these differences disappear with time.  
Buyers instead begin to differentiate public offers via price, with selfish buyers setting the lowest 
prices holding past performance and other factors constant.  
Our  results  also  suggest  a  link  between  a  subject’s  social  preferences  and  beliefs.  
Specifically, after sellers have agreed to contract terms but before sellers actually deliver quality, 
each  buyer  is  prompted  to  forecast  the  quality  that  will  be  delivered.    Maximin  buyers  are 
significantly more optimistic about their seller’s intentions than are other buyers both in public 
and private trades.  The role of social preferences in forming these expectations persists, even 
after the level of promised performance and past transgressions against the buyer are controlled. 
  Our results also allow for decomposition of the efficiency wage effect.  Like BFF we find 
that higher payment induces higher performance and that this holds even for subjects classified 
as purely selfish.  After controlling for price, however, we find that the social preference type of 
the seller still explains a significant portion of performance.  In public trades, for example, a 
buyer can offer a price to maximin seller that is 43 percent lower than that offered to a selfish    
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seller  and  expect  the  same  level  of  performance.    Maximin  sellers’  higher  performance  is 
consistent with helping the disadvantaged player as buyers regularly earn lower surplus in these 
contracts. 
  The  results  provide  a  detailed  view  of  how  heterogeneous  social  preferences  may 
manifest  in  complex  economic  interactions.    While  much  of  the  extant  research  implicitly 
acknowledges that heterogeneity exists with regard to the type and strength of social preferences 
that are present in experimental populations, much of this work focuses on identifying the social 
preference  structure  that  best  captures  the  average  respondent.    In  contrast  our  approach  is 
among the first to fully exploit subject heterogeneity by using a within-subject experimental 
design  to  identify  how  different  social  preferences  manifest  in  alternative  settings  (later  we 
discuss in detail the work by Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann and Hans-Theo Normann (2006), 
which  uses  a  similar  approach).    Finally,  our  research  provides  some  insights  into  the  link 
between generalized and personalized trust.  Steven N. Durlauf and Marcel Fafchamps (2005) 
refer to personalized trust as trust that emerges from repeated games and is characterized by self-
enforcing agreements and high levels of relationship specific surplus.  In contrast, generalized 
trust refers to one’s optimistic beliefs about a population of agents and is considered by Durlauf 
and Fafchamps to yield more efficient outcomes than personalized trust because generalized trust 
is  established  faster  and  more  cheaply  than  personalized  trust.    Our  results  suggest  that 
generalized trust is at least partly determined by social preferences as social efficiency types 
prefer  to  engage  in  private  trades,  shirk  less  than  other  types,  and  maximin  buyers  are 
significantly more optimistic than other buyers.    
  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.    In  section  2  we  discuss  our 
experimental approach and design.  In section 3 we provide a summary of results concerning the 
social preferences of our experimental subject pool, while in section 4 present results concerning    
  6 
the role of these social preferences in explaining the relational contracting results.  The final 
section discusses these results and concludes. 
2.  Experimental Design 
To explicitly link individual social preferences to relational contracting results we wed 
two established experimental protocols via a within-subject design.  First a protocol adapted 
from  Charness  and  Rabin  (2002)  is  used  to  classify  each  subject’s  social  preferences.    The 
adapted CR protocol pairs subjects together and requires each subject to make decisions that 
affect the monetary payoffs of both pair members.  Each game allows subjects to alter the pair 
member’s payment, usually by forgoing own payment (an example is included in the appendix 
containing experimental instructions).  By having each subject participate in a sequence of games 
with variations in roles and possible outcomes, various social preferences can be identified.  We 
consider  six  classes  of  social  preferences:  pure  self  interest  –  maximizing  own  payment; 
competitive – ensuring own payment is greater than the payment received by the other player 
(hereafter, other payment); negative reciprocity – choosing an option that reduces first-mover 
payment if the first mover’s choice will reduce second-mover payment; disadvantaged inequality 
aversion – ensuring payments are as equal as possible when own payment is less than other 
payment; maximin – choosing the option where the least-well-off player’s payment is highest; 
and social efficiency – maximizing the sum of own and others’ payments.
 1 
  The CR protocol provides an intentional or ‘cold’ measure of social preferences, i.e., 
when the subject is a second mover in a particular game, the decision impacting the first mover is 
made  prior  to  the  revelation  of  the  first  mover’s  action  (i.e.,  the  strategy  vector  approach), 
without knowledge of the first mover’s identity, and with no opportunity to identify the first 
                                                 
1 Several authors also consider positive reciprocity, i.e., situations where a ‘good’ move by the first actor inspires the 
second actor to reduce own pay to help the first actor, and advantaged inequality aversion, i.e., ensuring payments 
are as equal as possible when own payment is greater than other payment.  Empirically, these motivation have not 
been found to be as strong or prevalent (Charness and Rabin, 2002 and references therein).  Hence, we omit then 
from consideration.    
  7 
mover on subsequent occasions during any part of the experiment.  CR recognize that ‘hot’ 
social  preference  designs,  i.e.,  those  that  allow  for  response  to  specific  actions  and  remove 
anonymity may result in different measures of social preference parameters.  Previous research 
presents a mixed picture of whether ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ settings provide different (Eldar Shafir and 
Amos Tversky (1992), Rachel Croson (1999); Werner Güth, Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller 
(2001); Stephen V. Burks, Jeffrey P. Carpenter and Eric Verhoogen (2003)) or similar (Timothy 
N. Cason and Vai-Lam Mui (1998), Brandts and Charness (2000), Robert J. Oxoby and Kendra 
N.  McLeish  (2004))  measures  of  underlying  social  preferences.    Hence,  our  use  of  social 
preference estimates derived from the CR protocol can test the validity of using ‘cold’ social 
preference measures to predict behavior in ‘hot’ market settings.   
  The  second  protocol  is  a  contractual  economy  adapted  from  Brown,  Falk,  and  Fehr 
(2004).    To  facilitate  inter-study  comparison,  the  experimental  market  environment  is 
programmed in Z-TREE (Fischbacher 1999) using base code employed by BFF. 
  In this experimental economy, trade of a vertically differentiated good among subjects is 
conducted via bilateral contracts.  Subjects are randomly partitioned into two groups: buyers and 
sellers.  Buyers offer contracts to sellers specifying a price-quality combination for a unit of an 
abstract good.
2  An offer can be made to all sellers simultaneously with public knowledge that all 
other sellers are receiving the exact same offer (public offer) or to a single seller with knowledge 
that no other seller is receiving this offer (private offer).  A buyer can submit as many public and 
private  offers  as  desired,  though  the  first  acceptance  of  any  offer  by  a  seller  automatically 
withdraws all the buyer’s remaining offers, i.e., the buyer may only contract with one seller per 
period.  Sellers can accept, at most, one offer.   
                                                 
2 Experimental directions use the terms buyer, seller, price and quality, though we will interchangeably discuss 
results using the terms employer, employee, wage and effort.    
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Sellers  outnumber  buyers,  hence  some  sellers  will  not  participate  in  each  round  and 
instead collect a reservation payment, i.e., there is involuntary unemployment.  Furthermore, the 
seller can shirk, i.e., deliver quality lower than the agreed upon level, without contemporaneous 
financial penalty.  In other words, seller performance is unenforceable.  Buyers must pay the 
agreed-upon price, but need not make an offer to a seller in subsequent rounds.   
  Relevant market parameters mirror those used by BFF.  Buyers’ per-round payouts are: 




occurs    trade no   if    0
  occurs    trade if    10 P Q
 
where pb is the buyer’s payment, Q is the delivered quality level, and P is the agreed upon 
payment.  Sellers’ profit is: 




occurs    trade no   if    




where r is reservation earnings and c(Q) is a strictly increasing and convex cost function fully 
represented by the following schedule of quality-cost combinations: {1,0}, {2,1}, {3,2}, {4,4}, 
{5,6}, {6,8}, {7,10}, {8,12}, {9,15}, {10, 18}.  Agreed upon quality (Q
a) and delivered quality 
(Q) are allowed to be any integer from one to ten while the price can be any integer from zero to 
one hundred.   
  The trading environment allows for reputation formation.  Specifically, each party retains 
a unique identification number across all rounds and, at the end of each trading round, each 
subject is informed of the delivered quality and the payoffs for each partner (buyer and seller).  
This form of reputation development does not facilitate a subject’s global knowledge of all other 
subjects’  past  behavior,  but  does  provide  the  ability  to  evaluate  and  act  upon  the  past 
performance  of  previous  partners.    This  structure  of  reputation  tracking  is  at  the  heart  of 
relational contracting, i.e., relationship-specific rents can be earned if parties grow to trust one    
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another (i.e., develop personalized trust) over time while performance-contingent renewal can be 
wielded as a disciplinary ‘stick’ to foster that trust. 
  Each contracting session is comprised of two practice rounds and fifteen rounds that may 
determine eventual cash payment.  As in BFF, practice rounds featured only the bidding stage of 
contracting to avoid costless, deceptive signaling by sellers.   
  Our protocol differs from BFF in several ways.  First, due to limitations on computer lab 
size, our protocol features a thinner market: five buyers and seven sellers compared to seven 
buyers and ten sellers in BFF.  The ratio of buyers to sellers is virtually identical, however.  
Second, our subjects participate in two contracting sessions per experiment rather than one, i.e., a 
relational  contracting  session  and  a  session  that  is  identical  in  all  facets  except  quality  is 
perfectly  enforced.
3  The  order  of  the  two  sessions  within  an  experiment  is  counterbalanced 
across experiments to compensate for such differences; all identification numbers of subjects are 
changed between contracting sessions, and subjects are made aware of this; and experiment-
specific dummy variables are used to control for order effects in regression analyses.  Third, 
contractual rounds were shortened from 3 minutes to 90 seconds.
4  Fourth, the average level of 
compensation in our experiments is about $23, which, after adjusting for differences in local 
costs of living and differences in the length of the experiment, is slightly more than half the 
compensation rate received by average BFF subjects.  Finally, to reduce income effects that 
might emerge during a second session, one experimental market session is chosen to be the 
‘paying’ session via a publicly observed random process after both sessions are complete (a 
similar  random  incentive  tactic  is  employed  among  the  CR  decisions  rendered  by  subjects).  
                                                 
3 These sessions mirror BFF’s complete contracting sessions.  Each session is identical to the relational contracting 
session except the computer enforces delivery of the agreed-upon quality, i.e., Q
a = Q . 
4 A pilot session was conducted that featured longer rounds.  Nearly all trades were transacted within the first 90 
seconds of the round.  Furthermore, nearly all the 90-second sessions included in this study featured full trading.  
We conclude that the shorter rounds had little influence on resulting subject behavior and our results.    
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Subjects are fully informed of this compensation tactic at the beginning of the experiment and 
advised to treat each session with equal seriousness.   
  Eighty-four  subjects  participated  in  seven  two-hour  experiments  that  featured  two 
contracting sessions and eight social preference games.  Subjects were either a buyer or seller for 
all games in both contracting sessions, while each subject played both roles within each CR 
game.    All  trading  takes  place  on  networked  computers  enclosed  in  cubicles  to  eliminate 
between-subject visual contact.  Social preference questions were divided in to two packets of 
four  games  with one packet administered prior  to each  contracting session; the order of the 
packets and the order of games within packets were counterbalanced across subjects and across 
experiments.  Subjects were students recruited via e-mail and newspaper from various academic 
departments at the authors’ home institution.  
  Our within-subject design is closest to that of Blanco, Engelmann and Normann (2006, 
hereafter BEN), though it differs in several ways.  BEN’s design requires subjects to cast seven 
decisions during four simple games (ultimatum, dictator, public goods and sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma games), where second-mover’s decisions cast in the two games featuring sequential 
play (ultimatum and prisoner’s dilemma) were elicited via the strategy vector method.  BEN use 
continuous responses captured in the ultimatum game to calibrate parameters for a Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) model  of inequality aversion,  which are then used to  predict individual and 
aggregate behavior in the other three games.     
3. Social Preference Results 
  In the course of participating in the eight CR games described in Table 1, each subject 
cast thirteen decisions (three games were dictator games and featured a decision for only one 
role).  Compared to responses from similar games reported in Charness and Rabin (2002), six of 
thirteen responses yield frequencies that are statistically similar to those of CR’s subjects, who    
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were drawn from university communities in Berkeley, California, and Barcelona, Spain.  For the 
remaining seven games, our subjects made decisions more consistent with pure self interest.   
  Decisions cast during each CR game can be interpreted as consistent with one or more 
classes of social preference described in the previous section.  For the eight decisions in which 
the  subject  chose  last  or  cast  the  only  decision  (e.g.,  dictator  games),  the  consistent  social 
preference classes are listed in the last column of Table 1.  For games in which the subject was 
the first of two movers, we do not infer social preference classes because we lack subjects’ 
beliefs regarding how the anonymously-matched partner would decide.  Without these beliefs it 
becomes difficult to restrict the classes of social preferences consistent with a particular decision.  
Hence, for the remainder of the paper, we ignore first-mover responses to CR games.   
We next classify each subject’s ‘closest’ social preference class by comparing observed 
behavior and behavior predicted by the utility functions associated with the six social preference 
classes (see the appendix for more details and James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund 2001 for a 
similar classification tactic).  We find 45 percent of subjects perfectly adhere to the predictions 
of one of the six social preference classes (Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find this for 43 
percent of their sample); the remaining subjects are assigned to the closest class.   
Half of our subjects are classified as selfish, while about equal numbers are classified as 
competitive, disadvantaged inequality averse, social efficiency, and maximin (Table 2).  Only a 
few are classified as reciprocal.  Our proportion of self-interested types aligns with Andreoni, 
Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie (2003) who found about half of their sample adhered to pure 
self interest in a variant of the ultimatum game. 
Given the fact that some games are played after exposure to a contracting session, there 
was the possibility that the market experience influenced subsequent CR game decisions and our 
social preference measurement.  Indeed, Brandts, Riedl and van Winden (2004) find evidence of    
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such feedback in an experimental setting where social preferences are measured before and after 
exposure  to  different  degrees  of  market  competition.    However,  for  our  subjects  and  this 
particular setting, we find no statistical evidence of such an influence for the eight CR responses 
used in this analysis.  Specifically, multivariate analysis of variance tests for responses to the 
eight  games  confirm  there  is  no  difference  in  responses  by  the  subject’s  role  during  the 
contracting game (buyer versus seller, p = 0.29) or by order of game administration (before or 
after the first contracting session during a given experiment, p = 0.72).   
4. Relational Contracting Results  
  When quality is unenforceable, it is straightforward to show that an equilibrium involving 
purely self-interested subjects predicts full trade, minimal quality delivery (Q = 1) and low price 
(P = 5); hence, higher quality and price are suggestive of deviations from pure self interest.  To 
see this, note that in a one-shot interaction, the sequence of events are that (1) the buyer offers a 
contract which specifies P and Q
a, and (2) if the seller accepts, he chooses Q, which can deviate 
from Q
a.  Since the seller moves last and P is guaranteed, the seller maximizes that period’s 
profits with Q = 1.  The buyer, anticipating the seller’s behavior, sets P = 5, which ensures that 
the seller earns his reservation utility.   If instead, the parties interact repeatedly and it is common 
knowledge that the game will end after round fifteen, then the same outcome prevails in each 
round.  To see this, note that, in the final round, the parties are essentially in a one-shot situation 
so  the  one-shot  outcome  prevails.    By  backward  induction,  the  same  outcomes  occur  in  all 
previous  rounds.  The  level  of  individual  and  joint  surplus  at  the  pure-self-interest  Nash 
equilibrium is significantly lower than the social optimum of Q = 10.     
  BFF provide an analytic example where a subject pool consisting of 60 percent ‘fair’ 
subjects can sustain a socially efficient equilibrium (Q = 10) until the third to last period before 
deteriorating during the final periods.  While their experimental results do not approach Q =10,    
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they find quality increases from six in the first round to eight by the thirteenth round before 
declining thereafter (BFF’s Figure 5).  A similar time trend emerges in our data (Figure 1), 
though the absolute level of quality is lower than that observed by BFF.   
4.1 The Type and Number of Buyers’ Offers 
    The  buyer  sets  the  tone  for  subsequent  interactions  by  proposing  one  or  more  offers 
where each offer is attached to her unique, round-invariant identification number.  Analysis of 
buyers’ offers provides an opportunity to isolate the genesis of social preferences’ impact on 
market behavior.  By the design of the computer interface, a buyer’s first decision is whether to 
make an offer ‘private’ or ‘public.’  Both types are used extensively (45 percent public).  Private 
offers enhance the ability to establish long-term relationships.  For example, if a buyer wants to 
establish a relationship with seller A, then she only needs to make a private offer to seller A in 
every round rather than venture into the open market with a public offer and hope that seller A is 
the first to accept.  This is an essential feature of relational contracting as it implies that the 
promise of future relationship-specific  gains from trade can sustain high performance in the 
current period; i.e. it implies the existence of personalized trust.   
Public offers, on the other hand, instantaneously communicate with all sellers, including 
sellers with whom the buyer has no past experience.  In contrast a private offer is viewed only by 
the seller who is extended that offer.  In both public and private offers, however, buyers only 
have knowledge of sellers with whom they have previously interacted, and have no way of 
identifying the past performance or activity of other sellers. 
  The  use  of  public  contracts  is  significantly  different  across  the  six  classes  of  buyers 
(Table  3,  row  1,  c
2(5)  =  21.68,  p<0.001).    Three  of  four  offers  issued  by  competitive  and 
inequality averse buyers are in the public domain, while social efficiency and maximin buyers 
issue only 29 and 13 percent of offers in the public domain.      
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To control for other potential demographic and lagged behavioral influences upon the 
type  of  offer  issued,  an  econometric  model  of  the  probability  of  issuing  a  public  offer  is 
presented  in  Table  4.
5    Selfish  buyers  serve  as  the  base  category  for  the  social  preference 
categorical  variables.    The  regression  controls  for  several  key  demographic  characteristics 
including gender (69 percent male), age (21.2 years ± 3.9), race (69 percent white), academic 
major (44 percent are business and economics majors, 15 percent are other quantitative majors 
such as engineering and mathematics, and the remainder are some other major) and grade-point 
average (3.26 ± 0.51).  Hence, our measurement of the influence of social preferences upon 
contracting  behavior  is  not  confounded  with  influences  that  demographics  might  have  upon 
social  preferences  (e.g.,  gender,  Andreoni  and  Vesterlund  2001;  age,  John  A.  List  2004; 
academic major, John R. Carter and Michael D. Irons, 1991).  Furthermore, following BFF, we 
include controls for lagged factors that might influence the propensity to extend a public offer, 
including lagged seller performance and a time trend. 
  To examine the influence of social preferences on the probability of making a public 
offer, we test for the joint significance of buyer social preference parameters (c
2(5) = 37.45, p < 
0.01).  We also report the pseudo-R
2 of the model when buyer social preference class is dropped.  
The  pseudo-R
2  drops  to  0.31  from  0.41,  which  suggests  a  substantial  role  for  intentional 
measures of social preferences in explaining the type of offer extended by buyers.  
Buyers who display maximin and efficiency preferences during intentional CR games are 
significantly less likely to extend a public offer than selfish buyers (the omitted category) even 
after controlling for factors such as demographics and trading history that also influence the 
propensity to enter into private relationships.  Figure 2 plots the percent of trades in each period 
                                                 
5 All econometric models are presented with robust standard errors that are clustered on the 155 unique buyer-seller 
pairs that are observed during the 512 trades to account for unobserved effects from the pairing of two subjects, 
which might cause the composite error terms from the observations within each pairing to be correlated.      
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that  are  public  for  selfish  buyers,  for  maximin  and  efficiency  buyers  combined  and  for 
competitive  and  inequality  averse  buyers  combined.    Selfish  buyers  rely  more  heavily  upon 
public trades in nearly every period than do social efficiency and maximin buyers.  Competitive 
and inequality averse buyers issue a similar percent of public offers as other types of buyers in 
the first round but show no trend toward private relationships over time like other types.  
In  addition  to  buyer  social  preferences,  the  tendency  to  extend  a  public  offer  hinges 
tightly on a buyer’s past experience.  For example, we find that the probability of extending a 
public offer increases when last period’s seller failed to meet performance expectations
6 and 
decreases as the tenure of an existing buyer-seller relationship lengthens.       
One possible implication of these results is that social preferences provide an exogenous 
explanation  for  when  personalized  trust  is  most  likely  to  be  established.    Maximin  types 
consistently seek to establish personalized trust, perhaps because they have more generalized 
trust than other types, and that selfish and particularly competitive types are much less likely to 
engage in long term relationships built on trust.  Selfish and competitive buyers appear to prefer 
to operate through the public market place rather than form bilateral, self-enforcing agreements.  
4.2 Buyer Price Offers and Quality Demands 
Once the domain of the offer is established (public vs. private), a buyer specifies a quality 
request, which the seller need not follow, and a price, which must be paid by the buyer regardless 
of seller performance.  The price is crucial to the seller because it sets the maximum possible 
payment obtainable by the seller (i.e., the seller can fully shirk at zero cost and collect full price).   
Given the pivotal nature of the offer’s content and the functional differences in public 
versus private offer mechanisms, it is not surprising that we find offers extended via public 
exchange are distinct from private offers.  Public offers are lower in average price (22.73 vs. 
                                                 
6 In each round buyers are asked to predict the performance of their seller after the seller has accepted an offer but 
prior to actual performance.    
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42.11, p < 0.001), average quality requested (6.18 vs. 8.57, p < 0.001) and the average percent of 
surplus designated for the seller (34.72 vs. 45.06, p < 0.001).
7   
Clearly the domain of contracting affects the content of the offer.  However, the buyer’s 
decision  concerning  the  domain  is  likely  to  be  endogenous.    Hence,  separate  models  are 
estimated for public  and private offers  as part  of an endogenous two-stage switching model 
where the public offer model in Table 4 serves as the first stage and the inverse mills ratio from 
this model is included as a regressor in the Table 5 models.
8     
 Within  each  domain  of  offers,  social  preferences  play  a  role,  though  the  role  is 
substantially larger when private offers are considered.  Specifically, the null hypothesis that 
buyer type does not affect price or quality request is rejected for private offers (Table 5, last 
row).  Among public offers, however, it is rejected in the model of price only.   
Among private offers the largest degree of differentiation across social preference types 
involves the level of quality demanded (the pseudo-R
2 declines more than 15 percent when buyer 
type  is  excluded).    Recall  the  buyer’s  quality  demand  does  not  directly  affect  the  size  or 
distribution of surplus because sellers have unilateral latitude to shirk.  However, quality requests 
may play an important role in setting expectations for renewal, i.e., mechanisms that sort and 
match buyers and sellers throughout the course of trading.  For example, sellers who deliver a 
quality level of 4 to a buyer who demanded 4 may expect the buyer to renew next period while 
renewal may be less assured if buyer demanded more than 4.   
Selfish buyers demand relatively little from their private partners – the average request is 
8.24 quality units, which is significantly less than all other buyer types (p = 0.03).  Competitive 
and inequality averse buyers demand substantially more.  Because higher quality increases the 
                                                 
7 Unless otherwise noted, all non-regression two-group comparisons reported in the text are two-sided Mann 
Whitney non-parametric tests. 
8 The exclusion restrictions used for the first-stage probit is the lagged ‘negative surprise’ variable, which takes on a 
value of one if the seller delivered quality lower than the buyer expected and zero otherwise.  The mechanism for 
determining buyers’ expectations is discussed in footnote 6.      
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payoffs  of  buyers  relative  to  sellers,  everything  else  equal,  it  makes  intuitive  sense  that 
competitive and inequality averse buyers request more quality.   
When  raw  averages  across  buyer  preference  types  are  computed  (Table  3),  social 
efficiency buyers ask private trading partners for higher quality than the average of other buyer 
types (8.82 vs. 8.48, p = 0.08) and selfish buyers in particular (8.82 vs. 8.24, p = 0.04), which 
makes sense given that social efficiency is a monotonic function of quality delivered and that, as 
we will see later, higher quality requests result in higher quality deliveries holding all else equal.  
In the regression results, however, social efficiency buyers’ quality requests are not significantly 
higher than those of selfish buyers.  However, in the regression model for quality request, lagged 
quality  delivery  has  a  significant,  positive  influence  on  requested  quality.    Social  efficiency 
buyers sustain private relationships with higher lagged values for quality than other buyers (7.63 
vs. 6.49, p = 0.01, not reported in Table 3), which likely drives the lack of significance for the 
social efficiency dummy variable in quality request regression model. 
There is less statistically significant differentiation with respect to the prices extended in 
private trades – the regression model predicts that average buyers of most types will make offers 
in the low to mid-40’s.  There is a statistically significant trend toward maximin buyers’ offering 
lower  prices  than  selfish  buyers,  however.    Sellers  receive  higher  per-period  payments  on 
average than do buyers (26.0 vs. 17.9 for all trades, p < 0.001 and 31.1 vs. 27.7 for private trades, 
p = 0.18).
9  Hence, the stinginess of maximin buyers with regard to price does not directly 
diminish the welfare of the worse-off partner (i.e., themselves).   
Another way to note the differences across social preference classes is to consider the 
distribution of the surplus that each type of buyer is proposing to her partner.  Within private 
offers, a regression using the same explanatory variables as those in Table 5 (results are not 
                                                 
9 The reported p values are for a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for the equivalence of buyer and seller 
profits.    
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presented) shows that competitive and maximin buyers offer significantly less generous offers 
than do selfish buyers in terms of the percent of total proposed surplus designated for the seller.  
This is fully consistent with competitive types attempting to receive a larger payment than their 
partner.  With regard to maximin buyers, again, this is not inconsistent with attending to the 
needs of the worst-off player (themselves).  Note that our result that selfish buyers make positive 
surplus offers to sellers appears to contradict an earlier prediction that selfish buyers will only 
offer a price sufficient to ensure that the seller earns her reservation utility.  It should be borne in 
mind, however, that if selfish buyers believe that there exist non-self regarding types who are 
willing to cooperate even in the final period of our finitely repeated trading environment, then 
even selfish buyers may cooperate in earlier periods and make generous offers to sellers.  Thus, 
our results do not contradict well known models of reputation building (e.g. the model of David 
M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson (1982)) or previous results by BFF, 
which suggest that if rationality or selfishness of all traders is not common knowledge, then even 
selfish types can be disciplined in a finitely repeated game. 
The regressions in Table 5 also clarify that private offers are strongly influenced by past 
experience with the seller, regardless of the social preference structure of the buyer.  As the 
relationship  lengthens,  and  as  past  quality  performance  improves,  the  buyer  increases  the 
requested quality and opens her purse strings.  While price responds positively to the seller’s past 
performance, it is not an overwhelming response.  An additional unit of quality delivered by the 
seller in the previous period yields, on average, an additional 1.8 units of payment, while an 
additional 0.975 units of payment accompanies any renewal with the same buyer, yielding an 
increase of about 2.8 units in price (which is about seven percent of the private offer mean price 
of 42.1).  Additional units of quality, however, cost the seller 1, 2 or 3 units of payment, with 
higher cost increments occurring for higher levels of absolute quality.  Hence, at the margin, the    
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seller can only justify improving quality at low and middle levels of absolute quality.  Indeed, 
less than five percent of sellers ever deliver quality above 8 units, the threshold at which the 
incremental cost of quality shifts from 2 to 3 units. 
Once buyers venture into the public domain, however, the offers are more homogeneous 
across buyer types in general, though the general model masks some interesting learning trends 
across buyer groups.  With regard to the quality request, the regression indicates no statistically 
significant difference across social preference types when all periods are considered.  Additional 
regression results not reported here show that there is differentiation across buyer type during 
initial  public  trading  –  competitive  and  maximin  buyers  demand  significantly  lower  quality 
during the first four rounds.     
The prices attached to these public offers are significantly different across all trading 
periods.  In contrast to the differences in quality requests, however, the distinction across buyer 
classes increases during later trading periods.  Indeed, the F-statistic testing the null hypothesis 
that buyer type has no impact on price is 4.10 when only the first five periods are used.  It grows 
to 9.14 when the last five periods are used instead.  Across all rounds, selfish buyers offer lower 
prices, on average, than any other group when all other factors are held constant, though this 
difference is only statistically significant when compared to competitive and negative reciprocal 
buyers.  During the last five rounds, however, social efficiency buyers also offer significantly 
higher prices than selfish buyers while competitive buyers offer significantly lower prices than 
selfish buyers.   
Taken together, this suggests that the evolution of public trading patterns differ across 
social preference types.  Buyers’ quality requests quickly converge, and, instead, different types 
of buyers differentiate with regard to prices.  Higher prices may be offered as a carrot by all 
buyers  other  than  selfish  and  competitive  types  with  the  hopes  of  enticing  fair  sellers  into    
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accepting their contracts.  As BFF noted, fair sellers may reject unfair offers; thus, higher prices 
by our non-selfish/competitive buyers may be means by which these buyers might increase the 
odds that non-selfish sellers will accept their contracts.     
4.3 Social Preferences and Buyers’ Expectations of Seller Performance 
  An important intermediate output of the computerized trading environment is the buyer’s 
expectations concerning seller performance.  After a seller’s acceptance of the offer but before 
his subsequent performance, the buyer is prompted to predict the seller’s quality delivery.  Given 
that shirking is the norm (55 percent of trades involve shirking), a buyer may not consider a 
small  deviation  in  quality  that  unusual  and,  therefore,  we  focus  on  buyers’  expectations  of 
quality.  BFF show that deviations from a buyer’s quality expectations do play a pivotal role with 
fewer renewals occurring if sellers fail to meet these expectations (BFF’s Table 3).   
Our buyers expect sub-contractual performance in 45 percent of trades with an average 
expected performance that is 1.5 units below the quality specified in their offer.  As was the case 
for a buyer’s price and quality demands, a buyer’s expectations of shirking differ by the domain 
of the offer:  buyers expect more shirking in publicly initiated exchanges (1.87 vs. 1.20, p = 
0.002).  As before, we estimate a two-stage endogenous switching model to capture the buyer’s 
expectations concerning shirking in each domain (Table 5, columns 3 and 6).    
  After accounting for other important factors that can shape performance expectations, 
e.g., the quality request, price, past seller performance and the length of buyer-seller relationship, 
a buyer’s social preferences explains about ten percent of the variation in both private and public 
contracts.    The  strongest  regularity  in  terms  of  buyer  type  is  that  maximin  buyers  show  a 
consistent optimism in both domains: they expect less shirking than any other social preference 
group and significantly less shirking than selfish buyers.  In the public domain selfish and social    
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efficiency  buyers  are  among  the  most  pessimistic  while  competitive  types  are  the  most 
pessimistic in private trades. 
From the regression it is clear that buyers expect price to induce higher quality, i.e., 
buyers believe in efficiency wages or gift exchange.  The regression displays a quadratic pattern, 
with the effect of price upon quality expectations reversing around 62 for private trades and 
around 72 for public trades (90 percent of trades feature prices less than 62).  Expectations of 
shirking also depend upon the trading round in our fixed horizon market.  In private exchanges 
there is no time trend, i.e., pessimism does not grow or shrink as the rounds progress.  However, 
buyers are not naïve: their expectation of shirking more than doubles in the final period – a time 
when relationships are forced to end due to the fixed horizon of the market.  On the other hand, 
for public exchanges the degree of pessimism is not affected by the arrival of the final period.  
Instead, there is a marginally significant time trend where the expected quality shortfall steadily 
rises from 0.7 in the first round to 3.0 in the final round.   
This model also reveals how buyers perceived the relative effectiveness of their quality 
requests in each domain.  Holding price constant, a one unit increase in the quality request in a 
private exchange increases expected shirking by about a half unit.  Once the mode of exchange is 
a public offer, buyers expect shirking to increase nearly 0.7 units for every additional unit of 
quality requested, suggesting the buyers realized the relative futileness of quality requests within 
public offers.  This is congruent with our previous finding that buyers’ quality requests in public 
offers became less heterogeneous as time progressed. 
4.4 Renewal of Private Contracts 
  The  BFF  trading  environment  is  particularly  useful  for  studying  relational  contracts 
because  it  provides  a  mechanism  to  nurture  longer-term  relationships  via  renewal  of  private 
offers.  A majority of private trades (56 percent) occur between a buyer and a seller that are    
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continuing a past, private trading relationship.  The non-renewal of this relationship provides the 
contractual stick that may be wielded if sellers exhibit opportunism in the previous period.   
  To see how a buyer’s social preference may impact the use of this key instrument, we 
estimate two models (Table 6).  The first model postulates that private contractual renewal is 
solely a function of the buyer’s social preference type, other buyer traits, a time trend, and fixed 
session effects.  The probit regression model depicts no significant role for social preferences in 
general (￿
2(4) = 5.13, p=0.27), though social efficiency buyers are significantly more likely to 
renew private contracts than selfish buyers (p=0.048). 
The second model, inspired by  BFF’s  renewal  model, postulates that,  along  with the 
buyer’s  social  preference  type  and  other  characteristics,  the  buyer’s  history  with  the  seller 
influences  the  probability  of  renewal  with  lagged  quality  delivery  (both  absolute  quality 
delivered and quality surprises) and the sheer length of history between the partners driving the 
renewal decision.  Once these relationship specific items are controlled, there is no significant 
differentiation of renewals across buyer types (￿
2(4) = 4.39, p=0.36) and no pair-wise difference 
between  selfish  and  social  efficiency  buyers  (p=0.205).    Most  of  the  explanatory  power  is 
derived  from  absolute  lagged  quality  delivery  (high  quality  ￿  renewal),  relationship  length 
(longer ￿ renewal) and a time trend (later period ￿ renewal).  Contracts that result in a negative 
quality surprise are renewed no less frequently than those that meet buyer expectations once the 
absolute level of quality delivery is held constant.  This is not surprising given that more than 40 
percent of private quality deliveries fall short of expectations. 
4.5 Quality Delivery and Sellers’ Social Preferences 
  As the second-mover within the relational contracting setting, and as the only player with 
latitude to shirk, we expect sellers’ social preferences to play a crucial role in quality delivery 
and, therefore, in generating total surplus.  As with buyers, we expect seller performance will    
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significantly  differ  between  public  and  private  trades.    Indeed,  average  delivered  quality  is 
substantially higher in private exchanges (6.99  vs. 2.86, p < 0.001).  A likelihood ratio test 
rejects the null hypothesis that model parameters are identical for the models of private and 
public quality delivery (c
2(25) = 88.26, p < 0.001 for model 1, c
2(23) = 174.00, p < 0.001 for 
model 2).  Unlike our analysis of buyers’ offers, we assume the type of trade (public vs. private) 
is exogenous to the seller.  We believe that this is a reasonable assumption given that decisions 
regarding the type of trade are made prior to decisions on quality delivery.  Sellers are in the 
minority and often only receive a single offer or all offers of the same type (e.g., public), leaving 
them few chances to influence the domain of trade.   
BFF  found  that  sellers  respond  to  higher  prices  with  greater  effort,  supporting  the 
efficiency wage hypothesis.  In this spirit we estimate two models.  Model 1 (Table 7) posits that 
quality  delivery  is  a  function  of  prices  and  seller  type,  while  model  2  drops  price  as  an 
explanatory variable because, in principle, a fixed price that does not vary with quality in each 
round should have no incentive effects.
10 
The results from model 1 (Table 7) reveal the expected positive coefficient on price in 
both private and public trades, i.e., regardless of social preference class and the private versus 
public nature of the trade, higher price induces higher performance over most of the possible 
price range.  Holding price constant, however, we find large, statistically significant impacts of 
seller type on quality delivery in both public and private trades.  For example, holding the price 
constant, the model suggests that maximin sellers consistently deliver higher quality in both 
private and public trades than do selfish sellers.  Given the precarious position of the buyer, i.e., 
having limited recourse for disciplining shirking sellers, a delivery of high quality helps buyers 
who,  across  all  treatments,  average  lower  payments  than  sellers.    Thus,  it  appears  maximin 
                                                 
10 Inter-period incentive effects would also be ruled out in a finitely repeated game if all subjects are purely self-
interested.    
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sellers’ behavior in this contractual setting is consistent with their behavior in the CR games 
where they focus on improving the payment of the person in the least advantageous position.  In 
fact our maximin sellers tend to reverse the tables in private trades: buyers achieve higher profits 
(33.7 vs. 19.9, p < 0.001).  In the eyes of the buyer, the impact of trading with a maximin seller is 
substantial.  In private trading a buyer can offer a maximin seller a price that is 16 percent lower 
than that offered to a selfish buyer without receiving lower average quality; in public trades this 
grows to 43 percent. 
Interestingly, social efficiency sellers deliver quality that is statistically indistinguishable 
from that of selfish sellers in the models that include price as a regressor (model 1).  When 
interpreting results for model 1, however, the totality of the role that seller type plays is not clear 
because,  as  we  know  from  Table  5,  a  seller’s past  quality  delivery  will  influence  a  buyer’s 
subsequent price offer in a recursive fashion.  Thus, there may be some incentive effects from 
inter-period price variations that are functions of past performance.  However, past performance 
is likely to be highly correlated with sellers’ type so that social preferences may have both a 
direct effect on quality delivery and an indirect effect via price. 
In  model  2  we  remove  price  as  an  explanatory  variable  to  focus  on  the  direct  total 
influence of seller social preference type on delivered quality.  We find that social efficiency 
types clearly emerge as the highest performing class of sellers in private trades.  Quality delivery 
is precisely where such sellers should excel because total surplus is solely dependent upon the 
level of quality delivered to the buyer.  In other words, if a subject cares about total surplus than 
delivering  the  highest  possible  quality  is  the  only  way  to  accomplish  this.    Indeed,  social 
efficiency sellers deliver the highest possible quality in 74 percent of all private trades (compared 
to 35 percent of all other seller types).      
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The tendency for high quality delivery on the part of social efficiency sellers does not 
spill over to public trades, however, where social efficiency and selfish sellers deliver similar 
levels quality even when price is removed from the model (public model 2).  The lower quality 
delivery by social efficiency sellers in public offers appears to be only a minor drag on overall 
surplus realization, however, because only one in five trades featuring a social efficiency seller 
starts with a public offer.  This is significantly less than all other groups combined (20.9 percent 
vs. 47.3 percent, p < 0.001).  It suggests that once social efficiency sellers enter private trades 
they  then  remain  in  private  trading  arrangements  by  delivering  high  quality,  which  leads  to 
renewal and increasing prices.  Indeed, once in a private trade, social efficiency sellers are more 
likely to be renewed than all other seller types (68.8 percent vs. 42.2 percent, Pearson c
2(1) = 
11.01, p<0.001) because of high quality delivery.  Finally, the evidence suggests that it is social 
efficiency  buyers  that  are  the  chief  beneficiaries  of  private  relationships  with  these  highly 
productive  social  efficiency  sellers.    Specifically,  53  percent  of  social  efficiency  sellers’ 
deliveries in private trades go to a social efficiency buyer.  Put another way, social efficiency 
buyers have 24.7 percent of their private trades fulfilled by a social efficiency seller, while other 
buyers have only 7.7 percent of trades fulfilled by social efficiency sellers (Pearson c
2(1) = 
14.62, p<0.001).  In other words, social efficiency types appear to ‘find each other’ through the 
buyers’ heavy reliance on private offers and through sellers’ systematic delivery of high quality. 
4.6 Surplus Measures 
  Significant differences across social preference type consistently emerge for surplus 
measures obtained during private trades, though these differences are much weaker or non-
existent for trades initiated in the public domain (Table 8).  In particular, it is striking that there 
are no significant differences by seller type in the total surplus generated under public trades.  
This suggests that the type of market setting may have important implications for the    
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manifestation of social preferences with mechanisms that facilitate reputation formation 
exacerbating underlying heterogeneity that might emerge due to different social preferences. 
  Another gauge of the impact of social preferences comes from simple regressions of 
surplus levels upon buyer and seller social preference classes, buyer and seller demographic 
traits, controls for the period of trade and fixed session dummy variables.  Separate regressions 
are run for public and private trades, yielding six separate models though, to conserve space, the 
results are not reported.  Dropping the buyer and seller social preference classification yields a 
modest decline in R
2 for the public surplus regression models (6 percent for total and seller 
surplus, 11 percent for buyer surplus).  In the private surplus models, however, removal of the 
social preference classification results in a major decline in explanatory power, with declines of 
42, 34 and 29 percent for the R
2 in the social, buyer and seller surplus models.  In other words, 
the well being of both partners is relatively unaffected by the partners’ social preferences when 
trading is initiated with public offers.  Once in a private trade, however, individual well being 
substantially varies with the social preferences of both parties. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
  In this paper we use a within-subject design to link social preferences measured in a cold, 
intentional setting to subsequent behavior in a hot, dynamic relational  contract setting.  The 
explanatory role of social preferences in the present work is substantial with evidence that certain 
social  preference  types,  including  social  efficiency  and  maximin  types,  sort  themselves  into 
private relationships that are able to sustain higher, more equitably distributed levels of surplus.  
Even  within  the  self-selected  private  trading  regime,  the  social  preferences  of  both  parties 
substantially influence the level and distribution of surplus with the parties’ social preference 
type providing more than 40 percent of the explanatory power in regression models of the total 
surplus generated during such trades.      
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Though  the  subjects  that  display  self-interest  tend  to  generate  less  total  surplus  than 
subjects of some other social preference classes, these subjects do generate significantly more 
total surplus than the draconian predictions emerging from a Nash equilibrium involving subjects 
adhering to pure self interest.  This is consistent with the model of reputation building by Kreps, 
Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) and the claims of BFF that if rationality or selfishness of 
all traders is not common knowledge, then even selfish workers can be disciplined in a finitely 
repeated game.  The presence of cooperative or other-regarding traders implies that rents might 
exist even in the final period so that even selfish workers have an incentive to cooperate in 
earlier periods to preserve the possibility of capturing some of this rent.  Our analysis takes this 
argument one step further as we find that even beliefs about others’ selfishness or willingness to 
cooperative  might  be  a  function  of  social  preferences.  We  have  evidence  that  links  social 
preferences to one form of belief held by buyers – the belief that a partnered seller will not 
cooperate  and  deliver  sub-contractual  quality.    While  most  buyers  expect  shirking,  maximin 
buyers are more optimistic than self interested buyers, even after accounting for the contractual 
terms  (price  and  quality  request)  and  for  sellers’  past  transgressions.    Future  experimental 
designs may be able to parse finer results concerning the beliefs of individual subjects, perhaps 
by using social preference games to sort subjects into markets consisting of participants that are 
more homogeneous with respect to social preference class and by making this sorting procedure 
known to all participants prior to the beginning of trading. 
Much  of  the  empirical  social  preferences  literature  recognizes  that  agents  are 
heterogeneous in this regard.  To our knowledge, other than the current work, there are few 
studies  that  attempt  to  link  individual  differences  in  social  preferences  to  behavior  in  other 
settings.  The study of Blanco, Engelmann and Normann (2006) comes closest to our present 
design and intent, though the authors’ conclusion concerning the robustness of individual social    
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preferences across settings is more pessimistic than ours.  Specifically they find little predictive 
power  at  the  individual  level  though  aggregate  level  results  are  more  consistent  with  their 
measurements  of  social  preferences.    Their  greater  degree  of  pessimism  may  be  driven  by 
differences  in  experimental  design  and  choice  of  functional  form  for  social  preferences.  
Specifically they use two data points generated by each subject during an ultimatum game to 
calibrate  the  two-parameter  Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999)  model  of  inequality  aversion.    This 
calibrated  model  is  then  used  to  derive  sharp  predictions  for  individual  behavior  in  three 
subsequent games.  In contrast we use eight separate data points for each subject and use this 
information to allocate each subject into one of six different preference categories.  Our social 
preference classification is then used to look for broader regularities in a much larger, richer set 
of data generated by these individuals.   
While we find broad consistencies between subjects’ behavior in simple, cold laboratory 
games and in richer, dynamic laboratory games, the question of remains: Does the structure or 
strength  of  social  preferences  observed  in  the  laboratory  translate  into  natural  market  or 
institutional settings?  Indeed, evidence compiled by List (2006) comparing aggregate behavior 
of subjects drawn from the same population in both laboratory and natural market settings casts 
doubt upon the proposition that social preferences displayed in the laboratory are successfully 
transplanted to competitive market settings.  We view our within-subject design tactic as an 
integral step in further exploring this crucial question.  By providing a more nuanced view of 
social  preferences,  it  might  facilitate  the  process  of  identifying  the  mechanisms  that  create 
disparities between field and laboratory results.  For example, one might conjecture that field and 
laboratory settings may trigger different social responses; i.e., if in some field environments, the 
norms are such that people expect others to behave competitively and in a self-regarding manner, 
then  subjects  may  exhibit  concern  withdrawal  (Rabin  and  Charness  2002)  where  subjects    
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withdraw their willingness to behave in a non-self regarding way.
11  If such norms do not exist in 
the laboratory, then concern withdraw may never manifest itself in the laboratory and subjects 
may  appear  to  be  less  self  regarding  and  exhibit  gift  exchange  tendencies.
12    In  short, 
understanding manifestations of the spectrum of social preferences in different contexts may 
provide  another  avenue  for  researchers  to  identify  laboratory  biases  and  improve  laboratory 
experimental methodology and design to make these experiments more relevant for real world 
applications.
13  
                                                 
11 One can easily imagine that even people who have a tendency to be other-regarding or kind may withdraw the 
willingness to be other self regarding when they walk onto a used car lot, where salespeople are often perceived to 
be extremely self interested and opportunistic toward customers.  
12 Note that in this example, in contrast to List’s main point, it is not the attenuation of social preferences that 
potentially reduces gift exchanges; rather, in moving from a laboratory to a field setting, it is possible that one type 
of social preference (i.e. concern withdraw) negates another type of social preference (i.e. positive reciprocity). 
13 Our point here is similar to Charness, Guillaume R. Frechette, and Kagel’s (2004) that experimental outcomes can 
be quite sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes in design/presentation/procedures, and/or cultural elements.  In 
fact, these authors find that gift exchange can be significantly diminished by the mere inclusion of a payoff table.  
Hence, like List (2006), albeit for different reasons, these authors show that gift exchange is not as robust as 
previously thought.      
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Table 1 
 


























L: M, C, S, D  
R:E 
2A  (100, 1000) v. let B choose  31   50†
 
(32) 
--  -- 
2B
d  (75, 125) v. (150, 125)  37   34 
(32) 
--  L: C, N, D   
R: M, E 
3A  (700, 200) v. let B choose  79   56† 
(32) 
--  -- 
3B
d  (200, 700) v. (600, 600)  58   22
** 
(32) 
--  L: C, S  
R: M, E 
4A  (375, 1000) v. let B choose  29   54
** 
(35) 
--  -- 
4B
d  (400, 400) v. (350, 350)  95   89 
(35) 
--  L: M, S, E 
R: N 
5B
d  (300, 600) v. (700, 500)  77  --   67 
(36) 
L: C, S, D 
R: M, E 
6A  (750, 0) v. let B choose  74   47
** 
(36) 
--  -- 
6B
d  (400, 400) v. (750, 375)  81   61
* 
(36) 
--  L: M, C, S, D 
R: E 
7A  (500, 500) v. let B choose  56   41
 
(32) 
--  -- 
7B
d  (800, 200) v. (0, 100)
f  77   88
 
(32) 
--  L: M, S, E 





g v. (600,300, 900)  45   54
 
(24) 
--  L: M, C, D 
R: S, E 
Notes: (a) The letter ‘A’ (‘B’) refers to the first-mover (second-mover) role in the game.  (b) 
From Charness and Rabin, Table I. (c) Abbreviations are L (R) – left (right) option chosen, M – 
maximin, C – competitive, S – pure self interest, D – disadvantaged inequality aversion, E – 
social efficiency, N – negative reciprocity. (d) Represents a game where the subject is the last 
mover or only mover; these games are used in subsequent analysis. (e) **, *, † denotes the value 
in this cell is significantly different at the one, five or ten percent level from the Columbus result 
via a chi-square test. (f) Berkeley version featured a payoff for B of 0 rather than 100 for role B. 
(g) Berkeley version of this game featured 575 instead of 550 for all three players. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Social Preference Types  
Type  % of Subjects  Associated Game Patterns
a 
Selfish  50  LLLLLLLL (2)
b, LLLLLLLR (10), 
LLLLLRLL, LLLLRLLL (3), LLLLRLLR, 
LLRLLLLR, LRLLLLLL (4), LRLLLLLR 
(14), LRLLLRLL, LRLLLRLR, 
LRRLLLLR (4) 
Competitive   10  LLLLLLRL





9  RRLRLLRL, LLLLLLRL
c (3), 
LLRLLLRL, LLRLLLRR, LRRLLLRL, 
LRRLLLRR (2) 
 
Social Efficiency   13  RLLRRLRL, LRRLLRLR, LRRLRRLL, 
RLRLLRLL, RRLLRLLL, RRRLLLLR, 
RRRLLRLR, RRRLRRLR (4) 
 
Maximin  14  RRRLRRRR, LRRLLLLL (4), 
LRRLLRLL, LRRLRLLL (3), 
RLRRRRRL, RRRLRLLL, RRRLRLRL 
Negative Reciprocal  4  RRRLRRLL, LLLRLLRL, LRRRLLRL, 
LRRRLRRL 
Notes: (a) The eight games considered are those featuring the second-mover’s response or only 
mover’s response.  (b) The number of subjects following this pattern is in parentheses.  If the 
number is omitted, only one subject had this particular pattern of choices.  (c) Subjects with this 
response pattern were classified as disadvantaged inequality aversion and competitive types, i.e., 
the indicator value for subjects with this pattern was set equal to ½.    
Table 3 
Means by Buyer’s Social Preference Type  


















                 
% Public Offers  45.12  41.81  74.14**  75.00**  29.13**  13.33**  41.38  21.68** 
   
             
For Public Offers               
 
  Quality Request  6.18  6.46  6.12  4.47**  7.27*
  7.75  7.33  11.71* 
  Price  22.73  27.03**  28.95*  11.62**  15.27*  21.25  26.50  29.28** 
  Expected   
    Quality  


















  % Surplus to  
     Seller 
34.72  38.08*  40.34  22.57  39.75**  14.79  27.08  20.09** 
  N  231  97  43  45  30  4  12   
   
   
         
For Private Offers       
       
 
  Quality Request  8.57  8.24*  10.00**  10.00**  8.82
†  7.23**  9.59
  14.71* 
  Price  42.11  43.80  23.73**  59.00**  43.74  25.62**  48.24  57.64** 
  Expected   
    Quality  


















  % Surplus to  
     Seller  
45.06  44.22**  6.99**`   50.00*  61.77  25.87**  38.47  51.34** 
  % Renewals  55.98  46.83**  28.57*  100.00**  71.21**  54.17  53.33  8.59 
  N  281  135  15  15  73  26  17   
                 
Notes: †,*, ** denotes differences between the mean for the social preference type in that column and the mean of all other social preference 
types at the ten, five and one percent levels as determined by a Mann-Whitney two-sided test. (a) Nonparametric test of the equality of medians 
across the six social preference groups ~ c
2(5).    
Table 4. 
Determinants of the Type of Offer Extended by Buyers 
  Public Offer 
Buyer Social Preference Type   
  Competitive  0.736
† 
(0.390) 
  Disadvantaged Inequality Aversion  -1.711
† 
(1.037) 
  Social Efficiency  -0.969** 
(0.331) 
  Maximin  -1.362* 
(0.615) 
  Negative Reciprocal  -1.030 
(0.793) 
Other Buyer Traits   
  Male  0.060 
(0.281) 
  Age  0.045 
(0.037) 
  GPA  -0.887** 
(0.302) 
  Nonwhite  0.223 
(0.262) 
  Business/Econ Major  0.524 
(0.321) 
  Other Quantitative Major  -0.821
† 
(0.432) 
Other Explanatory Variables   
  Lagged Negative Quality Surprise  0.352* 
(0.171) 
  Length of Contractual Relationship  -0.652** 
(0.106) 
  Trading Period  -0.037
† 
(0.021) 
  Constant  2.465* 
(1.077) 








2 without types 
c







Notes: Probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered on buyer-seller pairs.   
†, *, ** denote statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent levels.    
 
Table 5. 
Determinants of Content of Buyers’ Contractual Offers and Expectations of Shirking 
  ------------- Private Offers -------------  ------------- Public Offers ------------- 
























































































































































































Price  --  --  -0.172** 
(0.030) 
--  --  -0.121** 
(0.044) 
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  ------------- Private Offers -------------  ------------- Public Offers ------------- 























2  --  --  0.001** 
(0.0002) 
--  --  0.001
† 
(0.0005) 
Quality Request  --  --  0.468** 
(0.084) 
--  --  0.682** 
(0.078) 



















































Controls for Fixed  
  Session Effects 
























































Notes: (a) Censored regression with robust standard errors clustered on buyer-seller pair and fixed session effect controls.  (b) Linear 
regression with robust clustered on buyer-seller pair and fixed session effect controls. (c) Inverse Mills Ratio from probit regression of 
Public Offer.  (d) The R
2 or pseudo-R
2 value that results from dropping all explanatory variables related to the social preference variables. 
The pseudo-R
2 for the zero-truncated negative binomial model is the R
2 between predicted and actual observations. (e) Chi-squared (for 
quality  request  model)  or  F-test  (price  and  expected  quality  shortfall  model)  statistic  associated  with  null  hypothesis  that  all  social 
preference type variables are jointly equal 0. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent levels.    
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Table 6. 
Determinants of Buyer Decision to Renew Private Contracts
 























































Other Explanatory Variables     
 Negative Quality Surprise  --  0.157 
(0.339) 
 Positive Quality Surprise  --  -0.114 
(0.456) 
 Quality Delivered  --  0.110* 
(0.046) 
 Relationship Length  --  0.146* 
(0.068) 

























175.35    
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Notes: Probit regression with robust errors clustered on buyer-seller pairs.  †, *, ** denote statistical 
significance at the ten, five and one percent levels. (a) Disadvantage inequality aversion is dropped 
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Table 7 
Determinants of Sellers’ Quality Delivery 
  ----------- Private ----------  ------------Public ---------- 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 

























































































Price  0.259** 
(0.067) 




2  -0.001 
(0.001) 
--  -0.002** 
(0.047) 
-- 












































Controls for Fixed Session 
Effects 








2 without types 
c

























Notes: Censored regression with robust standard errors clustered on buyer-seller pairs and fixed session 
effect controls.  †, *, ** denote statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent levels.    
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Table 8 
Mean Surplus by Social Preference Type and Offer Type 


















By Buyer Type                 
   All Offers     
           
      Total  43.9  46.2
†  34.5**  34.7**  49.6*  41.6  44.1  17.3** 
      Buyer  17.9  17.3  11.7**  16.9  23.4*  22.3  12.5  9.5
† 
      Seller  26.0  28.9**  22.8**  17.8**  26.2  19.3  31.6
†  35.5** 
      % Public  45.0  41.8  74.1**  75.0**  29.2**  13.3**  41.4  65.4** 
   Public Offers                 
      Total  25.7  28.0
†  33.8  20.5
†  16.6**  25.0  20.1  12.8* 
      Buyer  5.9  4.3  9.6*  10.8
  2.4  6.2  -4.8  9.3
† 
      Seller  19.8  23.7**  24.2**  9.7**
  14.2*  18.8  24.9  25.0** 
   Private Offers                 
      Total  58.8  59.4  36.7**  77.2
**  63.2*  44.1**  61.1  52.4** 
      Buyer  27.7  26.7  17.6*  35.0**  32.0*  24.8  24.7  23.6** 
      Seller  31.1  32.7
†  19.1**  42.2**  31.2  19.3**  36.4  54.4** 
By Seller Type                 
   All Offers                 
      Total  43.9  43.6  28.2**  41.5  65.0**  42.3  10.0**  28.9** 
      Buyer  17.9  16.4
†  14.3  6.4**  27.6**  25.1**  -32.8**  30.6** 
      Seller  26.0  27.2
†  13.9**  35.1**  37.4**  17.2**  42.8*  83.7** 
      % Public  45.0  48.1  57.7  43.6  20.9**  43.6  60.0  13.4* 
   Public Offers                 
      Total  25.7  25.6  18.4  27.4  30.2  27.7  10.0  6.0 
      Buyer  5.9  5.2  3.7  -3.0  7.3  14.0**  -34.7**  8.5 
      Seller  19.8  20.4  14.7*  30.4*  22.9  13.7*  44.7*  10.5
† 
   Private Offers                 
      Total  58.8  60.3  41.6*  52.3
†  74.3**  53.6*  10.0*  48.5** 
      Buyer  27.7  26.8  28.7  13.6**  33.0*  33.7*  -30.0*  19.5** 
      Seller  31.1  33.5**  12.9**  38.7*  41.3**  19.9**  40.0  69.7** 
Notes: †,*, ** denotes differences between the surplus measure for the social preference type in that column and the surplus obtained by all other 
social preference types at the ten, five and one percent levels as determined by a Mann-Whitney two-sided test. (a) Nonparametric test of the 
equality of medians across the six social preference groups ~ c
2(5).  
    

































Average Delivered Quality by Round    








































Maximin and Efficiency Buyers
Competitive and Inequality Averse Buyers
 
Figure 2. 
Public Offers Made by Buyer Social Preference 
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g j U , ( g j g j , , ,p p ¢ ) denote the utility derived by the subject for selecting the jth option in game g 
for the ith utility functional form, where  g j, p  denotes a subject’s own payment for the jth option in 
game g and  g j, p¢  denotes the payment of the subject’s partner.  We postulate six possible utility 
forms: 
(Selfish - S)         
S
g j U ,   = g j, p , 
(Competitive – C)       
C
g j U ,  = g j g j , , p p ¢ - , 
(Disadvantaged Inequality Aversion – D) 
D
g j U ,   = -max[ g j, p¢ - g j, p , 0], 
(Social Efficiency – E)     
E
g j U ,   = g j g j , , p p ¢ + , 
(Maximin – M)       
M
g j U ,   = min[ g j g j , , ,p p ¢ ] and 
(Negative Reciprocity – N)     
N
g j U ,  = y,  
where y is a dummy variable that equals one if the first-mover implements an action that 
diminishes the subject’s payment relative to other possible first-mover options and the subject then 
chooses an option that diminishes the first mover’s payment (the three games in which this occurs 
are denoted in table I).   
During the CR games, each subject faces the same eight decisions in the role of a last or 
only mover.  In each decision the subject is provided two options, j Î {L, R}, where L denotes the 
left option and R the right option.  For each utility function there exists a maximum (
i V ) and 
minimum (
i V ) utility obtainable across the eight games.  For each subject and each functional 
form, utility is calculated for the choices made by the subject during the eight CR games, i.e., V 
i =    










i V ] are then calculated for 
each subject and " i Î {S, C, D, E, M, N}.  The subject is then assigned to the preference category 
that generates the highest normalized utility score.    
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In this part of the session you will participate in several games.  Each game is explained on a 
separate sheet that you will receive.  You complete one game at a time until all the games are 
complete.  Later in the session, you will participate in several more games like these. 
 
In each game you have at most a single decision to make.  In each game your decision, coupled with 
the decision of another person in the room, will affect your take home pay.  You will never know 
the identity of the other person in the room who will affect the outcome of your game and you will 
never be matched with the same person twice. 
 
Each game has 2 players – Player A and Player B.  In each game there are several different 
combinations of possible payouts for Players A and B.  In most games, Player A can choose one 
combination of payouts or pass up this option and let Player B choose from a separate menu of 2 
different payout combinations. 
 
In this part of the session there are four different games and each of you will play each game twice 
– once as Player A and once as Player B.  If you are Player A, you can choose a certain outcome, or 
decide to let Player B determine the outcome.  If you are Player B, you choose 1 of the 2 possible 
outcomes in case Player A let’s you choose the outcome.   Both players will be fully aware of each 
other’s options in all games.  Remember, for each decision you will be matched with a different 
person in the room and you will never know the identity of that person.  Furthermore, you will not 
be informed of the results of any previous round or game prior to making your decision. 
 
At the end of the night, you will be given the results of all decisions from this set of games and the 
similar set of games you will play later.  Although you will have many ‘outcomes’ of the games, 
only one will be selected for payout.  We will roll a die to determine which outcome will be added 
to your take-home pay.  Because any of the outcomes can selected for payment, you should treat 
each decision as if it were the one that will be paid.   
 
To convert the numbers on the decision sheets to dollars, use the following simple formula: 100 = 
$1.00. 
 
At this point feel free to ask any questions.  If there are no questions go ahead and start working 
through the packet. 
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Example of Charness-Rabin Game 




In this ROUND, you are player B. 
 
· You may choose B1 or B2.  
· Player A has already made a choice.  
  · If he or she has chosen A1, he or she receives 100 and you receive 1,000.  
  · Your decision only affects the outcome if player A has chosen A2. Thus, you should    
     choose B1 or B2 on the assumption that player A has chosen A2 over A1.   
    · If player A has chosen A2 and you choose B1,  
      ￿ player A receives 75 and you receive 125. 
  · If player A has chosen A2 and you choose B2,  





/   \ 
/      \ 
/         \ 
A1 /            \ A2 
/              \ 
/                 \ 
/                    \ 
          A 100                    B 
          B 1,000                 / \ 
                  /    \  
                /        \ 
                   B1 /   \  B2 
                       /               \ 
                      /                  \ 
               A 75   A 150   






I choose (circle one):             B1       B2    
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Brown, Falk and Fehr Trading Game 
 
Instructions for Buyers (Sellers’ Instructions are similar and are not included) 
 
In this experiment everyone begins with $5.  During the experiment you can earn more money, with the 
exact amount depending on you and your pair member’s decisions.  During the experiment, your income is 
calculated in points.  At the end of the experiment, points are converted into dollars at the rate of:  
  $1 = 70 points 
Your initial balance of $5 equals 350 points.   
Without exception, all written information you received from us is for your private use only. You are 
not allowed to pass over any information to other participants in the experiment. Talking during the 
experiment is not permitted. Violations of these rules would force us to stop the experiment. If you 




The experiment is divided into periods.  In each period, you have to make decisions, which you will enter on 
a computer screen.  There are 15 identical periods in all and the experiments ends at the end of period 15.  
 
Participants are divided into two groups consisting of 5 buyers and 7 sellers.  You will remain a buyer 
throughout the experiment.  This session will involve trading between buyers and sellers.  The price agreed 
upon between the buyer and sell will determine how much money each party makes during the period. 
 
Trades will take place on the computer screen.  Buyers and sellers will each be identified by a number (from 
1 to 7, e.g., buyer #3, seller #5, etc).  Buyers and sellers keep the same identification number for all rounds of 
this game.  
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The Experimental Procedures in Detail 
 
Each period is divided into a trading phase followed by a quality determination phase.  
 
1.  The Trading Phase 
 
Each period starts with a trading phase.  During the trading phase, each buyer can conclude a trade with one 
seller.  In order to do so each buyer can submit as many offers as he/she wishes.   In each trading phase, 
you will see a screen with the following features: 
 
·  The trading period is indicated at the top of the screen.  The remaining time in the trading phase is 
also indicated at the top right corner.  The trading phase will last 90 seconds. When the time is up, 
the trading phase is over and no further offers can be submitted or accepted. 
·  Once the above screen is displayed, the trading phase starts.  As a buyer, you now have the 
opportunity to submit offers to sellers.  Offers must include the following, which is to be entered into 
the right hand side of the screen: 
a)  Specify whether the offer is to be public or private.   
 
Public offers will be communicated to all participants, both sellers and buyers.  In  
turn, you will see all public offers by other buyers.  A public offer can be accepted  
by any seller.   Simply click on the “public” field to submit a public offer. 
 
A Private offer is submitted to one seller only. Only the seller will be informed of the offer and 
only the seller can accept the offer.  Click the “private” field to submit a private offer.  After 
that, you must specify which seller you want to submit the offer to by entering the seller’s ID 
number.  Remember, every seller maintains the same ID number throughout all periods of the 
experiment.   
 
b)  Specify what price you want to offer.  Enter your price in the “Your price” field.  The price can 
range from 0 to 100 (whole numbers only). 
 
c)  Specify what quality you desire.  Enter this in the “Desired quality field”.  Quality can range 
from 0 to 10, where higher numbers are better (whole numbers only). 
 
After specifying the type of offer, the price, and the quality, click “OK” to submit it.  
 
·  On the left side of your screen, you will see the header “public offers,” which displays all public 
offers made by buyers, including your own offer.   
·  In the middle of the screen, you can see all private offers that you have submitted in the current 
trading phase.  
·  Each buyer can submit as many private and public offers as he wishes in each period.  Each 
offer that you submit can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
·  In any given period, each buyer can conclude at most one trade.  Once one of your offers has 
been accepted, you will be notified which seller accepted which of your offers.  This information 
will be displayed on the bottom right corner of your screen.  At this point, all your other offers will 
be removed from the market and cancelled 
·  In any given period, each seller can conclude at most one trade.  You will be continuously 
informed about which sellers have not yet accepted an offer.  On the bottom right of the screen, you 
will see 7 fields, each field for one of the 7 sellers.  Once a seller has accepted an offer, an “x” will    
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appear in the field next to the seller’s identification number.  You cannot submit private offers to a 
seller who has already concluded a trade. 
·  Once all 5 buyers have concluded a trade or after time has elapsed, the trading phase is over.  
·  No buyer is obliged to submit offers, and no seller is obliged to accept an offer.    
 
2.  Quality Determination Phase 
 
·  Following the trading phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade will determine the level of 
quality that they will supply to their buyers.  The product quality you asked for in your offer is 
not binding for your seller – i.e. your seller can choose any quality he/she wants to from 1 to 10.   
 
·  While your seller is determining quality, you are asked to specify which quality you expect him/her 
to supply.  In addition, we ask you to state how certain you are that the seller will actually deliver the 
quality you expect. 
 
 
How Are Points (Income) Calculated? 
 
Your Points 
·  If you do not conclude a trade during the trading phase, you will receive 0 points for that period. 
·  If one of your offers is accepted, your points depend on the price you offered and on the product 
quality.  Your points for that period are determined as follows: 
 
Your Points = 10*Product Quality – Price 
 
·  As you can see, the higher the product quality, the more points you earn.  At the same time, the 
lower the price you paid, the more points you earn. 
  ·  Higher quality at lower prices means more points for you. 
 
 
How do Sellers Earn Points?  
·  If a seller has not concluded a trade during the trading phase, he/she gains 5 points for that period. 
·  If the seller has accepted an offer, his/her income equals the price he/she receives minus the 
production costs he/she incurs.  The income of a seller is determined as follows: 
 
Points = Price – Production Costs 
 
·  As you can see, the higher the price, the more points a seller earns.  At the same time, the higher the 
quality, the higher the production costs, which reduces points.  
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·  How are production costs calculated?  The higher the quality the seller supplies, the higher the costs.  
All sellers have the following cost table: 
 
Quality  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Cost  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
 
Points for all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way.  Each buyer can therefore calculate the 
income of his/her seller and each seller can calculate the income of his/her buyer.  Further, each buyer 
and seller is informed about the ID number of his/her trading partner in each period.  
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period (lose rather than gain points).  These losses 
are subtracted from your points balance.   
 
You will be informed about your points and the points of your seller in each period on an “income screen.” 
The following information is displayed on this screen: 
 
·  the seller you traded with (ID number) 
·  the price you offered 
·  your desired quality 
·  the product quality you actually received from your seller. 
·  the points earned (lost) by your seller in this period. 
·  the points that you earned (lost) in this period. 
 
 
Please enter all the information on the screen in the documentation sheet supplied to you.  This will help you 
keep track of your performance across periods.  After the income screen has been displayed, the period is 
over.  Another period begins, starting with a trading phase.  Once you have finished studying the income 
screen, please click “continue”. All sellers also see an income screen displaying the same information. 
 
Before we begin the experiment, we ask all participants to complete a questionnaire which will test your 
familiarity with the procedures.  The experiment will not begin until all participants are completely familiar 
with all procedures. 
 
In addition, we will conduct 2 trial periods of the trading phase so that you can get accustomed to the 
computer.  During the trial periods, no money can be earned.   
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Control Questionnaire 
 
Please solve the following exercises completely.  If you have questions, ask one of the 
experimenters.  After all participants have answered the questions correctly, the experiment begins.  
 
 
1.  Suppose that you are a buyer and you did not make an offer during the trading phase.  How 
many points do you earn for this period?  
 
2.  Suppose that you are a buyer and you offered a price of 30 and indicated a desired quality of 
9.  A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a quality of 8.  How many points did you 
earn for this period?  
 
3.  Suppose that you are a buyer and you offered a price of 10 and indicated a desired quality of 
2.  A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a quality of 5.  How many points did you 
earn for this period?  
 
4.  If a seller did not accept an offer during the trading phase, how many points does this seller 
earn for that period? 
 
5.  Suppose that you are buyer no. 3 in round 2.  Does this mean that you will still be buyer no. 
3 in round 3? 
 
6.  Suppose that you are a seller and you accepted an offer with a price of 30 and a desired 
quality of 9.  You supplied an actual quality of 8.  How many points did you earn for this 
period?  
 
7.  Suppose that you are a seller and you accepted an offer with a price of 40 and a desired 
quality of 2.  You supplied an actual quality of 5.  How many points did you earn for this 
period?  
 
8.  Suppose that you are seller no. 5 in round 5.  Does this mean you were seller no. 5 in rounds 
1-4 and will continue to be seller no. 5 in rounds 6-10?  
 
If you have finished the exercises, we recommend that you look at the exercises and the solutions 
provided again.  After this, you should think about the decisions you’ll want to make to maximize 
your points.  
 